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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Robert Harrison Jr, appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence 
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of enticing children. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On April 10, 2006, Harrison pulled to the side of the road, picked up then 
ten year old S.G. and tried to get S.G. to go into Harrison's apartment with him 
under the guise of watching a movie. (Jury Trial Tr., p. 275, L. 6-9; p. 279, L. 1 - 
p. 286, L. 19; p. 288, L. 25 - p. 289, L. 9.) 
The state charged Harrison with second degree kidnapping and the matter 
proceeded to jury trial. (R., Vol. I, pp. 24-25; Vol. Il, pp. 264-65.) The district 
court denied Harrison's motion for acquittal pursuant to I.C.R. 29 upon the close 
of the state's case. (Jury Trial Tr., p. 567, L. 23 - p. 573, L. 11.) The district 
court did, however, present the jury with an advisory instruction to acquit on the 
kidnapping charge while instructing on the lesser included offense of enticing 
children. (Jury Trial Tr., p. 573, Ls. 11-20; R., Vol. II, pp. 285, 287.) The jury 
found Harrison guilty of enticing children and the district court subsequently 
denied his motions to set aside that verdict and for a new trial. (R., pp. 293-294; 
Jury Trial Tr., p. 732, Ls. 9-11; 11/08/06 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 8-10; p. 40, Ls. 5-17.) 
Harrison was sentenced and judgment of conviction was entered. (Jury Trial Tr., 
p. 749, Ls. 10-17; R., Vol. 11, p. 337.) Harrison timely appealed the judgment of 
conviction entered by the district court. (R., Vof. 11, pp. 338-340.) 
ISSUES 
Harrison's brief does not contain a statement of the issues. The state 
submits the issues as follows: 
1. Has Harrison failed to show reversible error when the district judge instructed 
the jury on the elements of enticing a child? 
2. Has Harrison failed to meet his burden of establishing I.C. 9 18-1509(1) is 
unconstitutionally vague? 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
Harrison Has Failed To Show That The District Court Committed Reversible 
Error When It Instructed The Jury 
A. Introduction 
Harrison asserts that the district court committed reversible error by failing 
to instruct the jury that enticing a child under 16 to enter a vehicle must be done 
with the intent that the child be concealed from public view. (Appellant's brief, p. 
2.) Harrison has failed to show reversible error where the district court's 
instruction mirrored the language of the statute. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury is a question of law, 
over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Keaveny, 136 ldaho 31, 33, 
28 P.3d 372, 374 (2001). This Court reviews the instructions to determine 
whether, taken as a whole, they fairly and accurately present the issues and 
state the applicable law. j&. Construction of a statute is also a matter given free 
review. State v. O'Neill, 118 ldaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990); State v. 
Schmoll, 144 ldaho 800, 803, 172 P.3d 555, 558 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Reves, 
139 ldaho 502,505, 80 P.3d 1103,1106 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. The District Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error In lnstructina the Jury 
If the instructions given, taken as a whole, fairly and accurately reflect the 
law, there is no error. State v. Stricklin, 136 ldaho 264, 267, 32 P.3d 158, 161 
(Ct. App. 2001). Reversible error in jury instructions occurs only if the 
instructions misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Row, 
131 ldaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998); State v. Colwell, 124 ldaho 
560, 564, 861 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1993). The giving of an instruction that 
"essentially follows the words of a statute normally is not error." State v. Ara~on, 
107 ldaho 358, 362, 690 P.2d 293, 297 (1984). Here, the district court's 
instruction regarding the offense of enticing children mirrored the language of the 
statute. I.C. § 18-1509, enticing of children, provides 
(1) A person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if that person 
attempts to persuade, or persuades, whether by words or 
actions or both, a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) 
years to either: 
(a) Leave the child's home or school; or 
(b) Enter a vehicle or building; or 
(c) Enter a structure or enclosed area, or alley, with the 
intent that the child shall be concealed from public view; 
while the person is acting without the authority of (i) the custodial 
parent of the child, (ii) the state of ldaho or a political subdivision 
thereof or (iii) one having legal custody of the minor child. Nothing 
contained in this section shall be construed to prevent the lawful 
detention of a minor child or the rendering of aid or assistance to a 
minor child. 
This statute was enacted as written in 1985 and there have been no changes to 
the language since then. 1985 Sess. Laws, ch. 81, p. 156 (codified at ldaho 
Code 5 18-1509). The district court instructed the jury that in order to find 
Harrison guilty of enticing of children, they must find 
1. On or about April 10, 2006 
2. in the county of Blaine, State of ldaho 
3. the defendant ROBERT JOE HARRISON, Jr., 
4. did attempt to persuade, or did persuade, whether by words 
or actions, or both, 
5. a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years to enter a 
vehicle, 
6. while the defendant did not have authority of the custodial 
parent of the child, or the state of ldaho or political 
subdivision thereof, or did not have legal custody of the 
minor child. 
(R., I .  I ,  p. 287.) 
The district court's instruction mirrors the language of the statute. 
Harrison, however, argues the jury should have been instructed that Harrison 
attempted to persuade or persuaded his victim to enter a vehicle with the intent 
to conceal him from public view. (Appellant's brief, pp. 2-3.) Harrison objected to 
the instruction as given at trial. (Jury Trial Tr., p. 693, L. 4 - p. 694, L. 18.) The 
district court at that time properly concluded that the "public view" language 
specifically modified only subsection (l)(c) of the statute dealing with an attempt 
to persuade a child to enter a structure or enclosed area and therefore did not 
alter its instruction. (Jury Trial Tr., p. 694, L. 22 - p. 699, L. 20.) Harrison has 
failed to cite to any appropriate authority for an alternative interpretation of the 
statute. The statute provides for three separate circumstances in which an 
accused can persuade or attempt to persuade a minor child. These distinct 
circumstances are separated by semicolons and the word "or". Reading the text 
of the statute itself, it is only the third scenario that is modified by the requirement 
that a child be concealed from public view. 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of a 
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 ldaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute 
must be construed as a whole. Irl, Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 ldaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 ldaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 
(1996). The court assumes that the legislature meant what is clearly stated in 
the statute, "[u]nless the result is palpably absurd." m, 133 Idaho at 462, 
988 P.2d at 688. The plain language of I.C. Ij 18-1509(1) is unambiguous. It is 
impermissible to persuade or attempt to persuade a child under the age of 16 to 
enter a vehicle or building without the proper authority. 
Harrison asks this court to modify the plain meaning of the statute and 
require an additional intent element not required by the statute. He cites to 
v. Sindak, 116 ldaho 185, 774 P.2d 895 (1989), as authority for this issue. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) Harrison's reliance on this case is misplaced. Sindak 
claimed that I.C. Ij 18-1509(1) was "void for vagueness" in that the statute 
provides no notice as to the conduct that is forbidden. id. at 187-88, 774 P.2d at 
897-98. The court engaged in a "summary review" of the decision of the district 
court rejecting that claim. Id, Harrison points to the following language as 
support for his position that the "intent to conceal a child from public view" 
language applies to all three subsections: 
As noted in the decision of the district court, the statute is not overly 
broad. While the statute forbids one to persuade or attempt to 
persuade a minor child under sixteen to leave its home or school, 
or to enter buildings, etc. with the intent to conceal the child from 
public view, nevertheless the proscribed acts must be done without 
proper aufhorify. As discussed in the opinion of the district court, 
permission or authority to do the proscribed acts may be express or 
implied, and the burden to show othewise is placed on the state. 
Id. at 188, 774 P.2d at 898 (emphasis original) (cited at Appellant's brief, p. 3). 
-
The focus of the court's discussion was obviously directed to the "without 
proper authority" prong of the statute. The court followed the above passage 
with a portion of the district court's opinion discussing the notice available to the 
defendant regarding the proper authority element. & The court agreed with the 
district court that, "the statute gave Sindak sufficient notice that attempting to 
persuade [J.B.] to leave his home without parental authority would subject him to 
the penatties of the law."' & at 188, 774 P.2d at 898. 
Harrison is asking this court to unnecessarily modify the language of a 
statute to suit the facts of his case based on a line of dicfa from the Sindak court 
paraphrasing a portion of the enticing of children statute. The portion of the 
statute paraphrased played no role in the court's discussion and was not 
included in the subsequent text of the decision. More importantly, the holding of 
the case does not mention intent to conceal; the court affirmed the previous 
decision of the district court on the basis that the statute gave notice that enticing 
a child from his home was illegal (without any mention of intent to conceal). 
Harrison has failed to show the district court committed reversible error in 
instructing the jury on enticing of children where the court followed the language 
of the statute and the statute is clear on its face. 
II. 
Idaho Code Section 18-1 509(1) Is Not Unconstitutionallv Vague 
A. Introduction 
Harrison asserts I.C. 3 18-1509(1) is vague in all applications and 
therefore void for vagueness. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.) Harrison has failed to 
meet his burden in establishing the unconstitutionality of the statute. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The meaning and effect of a statute, including the statute's 
constitutionality, is a question of law over which the appellate courts exercise free 
review. State v. Hart, 135 ldaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). "The party 
attacking a statute on constitutional grounds must overcome a strong 
presumption of validity." State v. Laramore, 145 ldaho 428,430, 179 P.3d 1084, 
1086 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Korsen, 138 ldaho 706, 71 1, 69 P.3d 126, 
131 (2003). "Appellate courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute 
that upholds constitutionality." Id. "A statute should not be held void for 
uncertainty if any practical interpretation can be given it." State v. Hetlickson, 
135 ldaho 742, 744, 24 P.3d 59, 61 (2001) (quoting State v. Cobb, 132 ldaho 
195, 197,969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998)). 
C. ldaho Code Section 18-1 509(1) Is Not Unconstitutionallv Vasue 
The court in Sindak addressed the issue of the constitutionality of I.C. $i 
18-1509 and found that it was not void for vagueness: "[wle agree, and affirm 
the district court in its holding that the statute in question is not void for 
vagueness, nor overbroad as intruding upon constitutionally protected conduct." 
116 ldaho 185, 188, 774 P.2d 895, 898. Although Harrison cites to Sindak and 
its holding in a different part of his brief, he does not cite to it in his argument that 
the statute is vague. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4, 6-10.) Because Harrison is not 
asking this court to overrule Sindak, it is controlling in this case. Even if m k  
were not controlling, Harrison has failed to show the enticing statute is vague. 
The starting place in determining if a statute is or is not unconstitutionally 
vague is to look at the defendant's conduct in question. This court in Laramore 
addressed the issue: 
Because a defendant 'who engages in some conduct that is clearly 
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied 
to the conduct of others ... [a] court should therefore examine the 
complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical 
applications of the law.' The reason for the suggested analytical 
starting point is readily apparent, for if a statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant's conduct, it 
necessarily is not unconstitutional on its face. 
145 Idaho 428,431, 179 P.3d 1084, 1087 (quoting Villaae of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 
L.Ed.2d 362, 369 (1982)). 
In the instant case, Harrison stopped his truck and signaled for a ten year 
old boy he didn't know to come over and was insistent, telling him five or six 
times, that the boy get into his vehicle. (Jury Trial Tr., p. 279, L. 3 - p. 282, L. 6, 
p. 380, L. 24 - p. 381, L. 7.) Harrison then drove his vehicle the opposite 
direction from where S.G. said he was going, telling the boy he had to drop 
something off at his house. (Jury Trial Tr., p. 282, Ls. 2-25.) The boy was 
frightened and left on foot after Harrison had driven to his own apartment, asked 
him if he liked rock and roll, and whether he wanted to come in and watch a 
movie. (Jury Trial Tr., p. 284, L. 23 - p. 287, L. 21.) When questioned by law 
enforcement about the incident, Harrison's first response was to ask if the boy 
accused Harrison of touching him. (Jury Trial Tr., p. 420, L. 16 - p. 421, L. 3.) 
Harrison later denied any contact with the boy or any knowledge of the incident. 
(Jury Trial Tr., p. 421, L. 11 - p. 422, L. 5.) 
It is not outside the ability of a person of ordinary intelligence to 
understand that the statute prohibits taking a child without permission and 
convincing him to get into your vehicle. Harrison's own actions indicate he 
understood, and therefore had been put on notice, that his conduct was not 
permissible. Harrison's first instinct was to minimize any accusations against 
him. Harrison has failed to show that the statute is facially vague. 
Harrison provides this court with a number of hypotheticals in arguing that 
the statute does not make sense without the application of the intent to conceal 
language to all three subsections. (Appellant's brief, p. 9.) This tactic was 
specifically rejected by the court in Laramore. Laramore attacked the term 
"dating relationship" as being facially vague and in support of his argument put 
forth a number of hypothetical social relationships that he asserted would require 
a guess to determine if they were dating relationships or not. Laramore, 145 
ldaho at 431, 179 P.3d at 1087. The court made it clear this was not the proper 
inquiry and instead Laramore had to show that there was no set of circumstances 
under which the statute would be valid. (citations omitted). Harrison's 
hypotheticals are not the proper inquiry, nor are they useful to the inquiry of the 
constitutionality of the statute. Harrison's own conduct is an example of a set of 
circumstances where an individual of ordinary intelligence would be on notice 
that his actions were impermissible. Persuading a child to get into a vehicle 
without the appropriate permission of one responsible for such child was conduct 
clearly proscribed by the statute. Because the statute is not "impermissibly 
vague in all its applications," Hellickson, 135 ldaho at 745, 24 P.3d at 62, 
Harrison has failed to meet his burden of establishing that it is unconstitutionally 
vague. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Harrison's conviction. 
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